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Introduction: the purpose of school inspection 
‘Raising standards, improving lives’ has been Ofsted’s strap line for some time. The 
strategic plan for 2011-15 specifies this vision in four priorities and indicates a focus 
on improvement of outcomes for learners of all ages, and a strong focus on 
underperforming schools.1 Recent debates in the media, however, indicate some 
concerns about Ofsted’s impact on the improvement of schools.2 Variability in the 
quality of inspection teams, the reliability of inspection judgments, the tight inspection 
framework which leaves little room for innovation and the high stakes context that 
motivates teaching to inspection standards and manipulation of inspection data are 
some of the issues being raised. The aim of sustained and continuous improvement 
of all schools through inspections is widely supported, but if and how this aim is 
achieved is strongly contested. We review the international evidence to highlight key 
considerations for any inspection system, as well as the specific issue of the degree 
of fit between Ofsted frameworks and the wider direction of schools policy. 
What research tells us about Ofsted’s impact 
Research reviewed from England indicates the powerful influence of Ofsted on 
schools’ actions, but whether this influence is overall positive or negative depends on 
the type of school inspected and the quality of inspections.  
Impact on student achievement 
Hussain’s and Allen and Burgess’ sophisticated analyses of large, longitudinal 
datasets indicate a link between the findings of an inspection report and student 
achievement results. They suggest that a negative inspection judgement may prompt 
or accelerate actions to improve student performance, even where no external 
interventions are made.3 Other studies from Shaw et al., Harris and Chapman, and 
Rosenthal, however, show no relation between inspections and student 
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achievement, or even a decline in student achievement results after inspection 
visits.4 These inconclusive findings can be explained by the different research 
methodologies used to look at links between inspection and student achievement 
and different timeframes,5 as well as changes in Ofsted’s approach to the inspection 
of schools. There is, then, no clear picture of the impact of school inspections on 
student achievement, whether the impact is similar across the system or perhaps 
different for schools in different contexts or at different ends of the performance 
spectrum. 
Changes in teaching and organisation of the school 
Qualitative studies by Courtney, Dougill et al., Baxter and Clarke, and Tymms and 
Jones (in prep)6 indicate that headteachers from schools that were inspected in the 
year before they were surveyed focus more on inspection framework priority areas 
and on improving their capacity-building and school organisation compared to 
headteachers who were inspected a longer time ago. Jones and Tymms also report 
of teachers teaching to the test and to inspection criteria, and of head teachers who 
narrow the curriculum and teaching in order to meet the Ofsted framework.7 Analysis 
by Francis using data from all inspections showed that particularly in areas where 
children faced multiple disadvantages schools often failed to improve from one 
inspection to another.8 These schools received ‘satisfactory’ ratings in two 
successive inspections with ‘satisfactory’ capacity to improve. Francis comments that 
although Ofsted reports highlight what needs to be done, there is little guidance on 
how to do it. Ofsted’s latest annual report on the other hand indicates that, overall, 
schools and colleges across the country are performing better than a year ago. 
According to Ofsted, more focused inspections and the changing of the ‘satisfactory’ 
grading to ‘requires improvement’ has resulted in over 90% of schools judged as 
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requiring improvement to make satisfactory progress in remedying their 
weaknesses.9  
Other themes in studies about Ofsted concern the variability in the quality of 
inspectors and the implications of inspection outcomes for headteachers’ careers. 
Courtney,10 for example, argues that insufficient consideration is given in inspections 
to the contexts and challenges facing schools serving areas of disadvantage, and 
that this may make it more difficult to recruit headteachers for such schools. 
Courtney’s findings about variability in the quality of inspectors may be a 
consequence of changes to the framework, which purports to give greater weight to 
the professional judgement of inspectors; the implications of this are discussed 
further by Baxter and Clarke,11 who draw on interviews with members of 
inspectorates and other relevant bodes in participating countries carried out as part 
of the Governing by Inspection project.12 The skills of contracted inspectors have 
been questioned13 and in May 2014 Ofsted announced it would be cutting its ties 
with outsourcing companies such as CfBT, Serco and Tribal and bringing school and 
college inspections in-house from next year – giving it more direct control over their 
selection, training and quality assurance.14 
International evidence about effective school inspections 
Recent reviews from Klerks15 and Nelson and Ehren16 indicate that the positive 
impact of inspections can be found in four areas: 
 improvement/introduction of school self-evaluation; 
 behavioural change of teachers (and school leaders) to improve effective 
school and teaching conditions; 
 student achievement results. 
As Nelson and Ehren note, inspection may have an impact on any or all of the 
above, but this is not necessarily the case. Where accountability systems that 
include inspection have been in place for a lengthy period, annual reports and 
evaluations from or on behalf of inspectorates show that schools are improving 
overall. Interventions in place in these systems ensure that those schools which 
perform very poorly will either improve, with the extensive support provided, or be 
closed down. However, although they do not sink into the category where they are 
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judged to be failing to provide an adequate quality of education, some schools in 
these jurisdictions remain ‘stuck’ or ‘coasting’. As for the research on Ofsted, the 
wider evidence suggests that such schools tend to serve areas of disadvantage. 
Research on the factors which link inspection to impact is complicated both by the 
position of inspection within an accountability framework, which may include national 
testing and school self- evaluation and by numerous other variables. As well as 
positive effects, research shows that inspection, as part of a high stakes external 
accountability system, may have unintended negative consequences. 
 
Factors identified in the literature that lead to inspection having more or less (positive 
and/or negative) impact include the quality of feedback; whether or not inspection 
reports, test results and league tables are published; the presence or not of parental 
choice; the quality of school leadership and school capacity to improve; and the 
strength of sanctions and support. Another factor is norm-setting around inspection 
standards (including ‘performativity’). Norm-setting here refers to the mechanisms in 
which schools demonstrate, through documentation and pedagogy that they are 
meeting the expectations of inspectors; it links to concerns about ‘gaming’ where 
schools ‘brush up’ or manipulate behavior they have to report on to receive a more 
positive assessment.17  
High quality feedback to schools, and how feedback is provided, is important if the 
feedback is to lead to improvement in student outcomes. Arguments for the 
publication of inspection reports and/or ‘league tables’ of pupil performance data are 
that parents will use these to select schools for their children and that the publication 
of a negative report will stimulate lower-performing schools to improve.18 However, 
research evidence from the Netherlands19 and England20 shows that parents rarely 
use published information as the primary motive for their choice of school. The 
majority of research on the impact of league tables shows negative effects, such as 
a narrowing of the curriculum, focusing on particular groups of pupils or teaching to 
the test.21 A recent study by Ehren et al (submitted) suggests that inspection in six 
European countries (including England) primarily drives change indirectly, through 
encouraging certain developmental processes, rather than through more direct 
coercive methods. Inspectorates that set clear expectations and standards on good 
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education have a distinct impact on the improvement of self-evaluation in schools 
and on the improvement of capacity-building in the school.  
Some studies also suggest that sanctions and rewards have a positive effect on 
educational quality in schools. The operating assumption in these studies is that 
schools work harder to perform well when something valuable is to be gained or lost; 
information and feedback alone is seen as insufficient to motivate schools to perform 
to high standards.22 Responses to inspection tend to be most focused and effective 
where funding is at stake or exposure is higher.23 Formal sanctions, such as forced 
reconstitution of consistently low performing schools, were more likely to promote 
responses than just embarrassment from grading schools and reporting results 
publicly. They may cause schools to be more aware of inspection standards, and 
force them to comply to those standards. However, Elmore and Fuhrman24 also 
describe how schools operating under severe sanctions in high-stakes test based 
accountability systems do not appear to be making fundamental changes in their 
core processes. Instead, they seem to place considerable emphasis on test 
preparation and make quick-fix solutions which lead to rapid improvement on the 
accountability measures. Some of these schools may incorporate structural changes 
but few appear to be making extensive or deep efforts to rethink their instructional 
programmes. 
Changing landscapes 
The limited and sometimes negative impact of centralized reforms and accountability 
structures has in many countries led to changes in how they are trying to improve 
their education systems. Education reforms are moving away from standard-based 
centralized improvement to strengthening decentralized local networks of schools 
that exchange knowledge about effective practices and support each other in finding 
and developing innovative solutions for complex educational problems.25 The 
purpose of strong local networks is to enhance innovation and generate system-wide 
improvement (what the McKinsey report frames as moving ‘from good to great’26). In 
England, national strategies for school improvement are being abandoned and the 
school system is being restructured to focus on improvement driven by schools 
themselves.  
These structures for localized school-to-school evaluation and improvement have 
many consequences for the role of school inspections. The current accountability 
framework in England is focused on individual schools: performance tables assess 
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the performance of each school separately and Ofsted still largely reports on 
individual schools.  
This centralized top-down approach does not sit well with the aim to promote more 
localized processes of change and innovation where stakeholders work together in 
strong supportive and high-trust networks to define the problems they need to solve 
(e.g. low student achievement in a particular area), and trial and test solutions for 
these problems with all stakeholders involved.27 On the contrary, such centralized 
approaches enhance and legitimize a ‘one size fits all’ strategy for success to 
national standards, encourage risk averse behaviour in schools and window-
dressing of successful rituals. In performing for inspectors, management and staff 
become adept at disguising the real problems and issues that face the school. This 
can mean that these issues do not get the attention and support they require. 
Moreover, inspection feedback is often distant (in time) from the behaviour the 
feedback is related to and, therefore, does not contribute to the trialling and testing of 
new solutions.  
Conclusion: enhancing Ofsted’s impact 
A change in Ofsted’s role and working methods is, therefore, needed to improve their 
impact on school improvement, and enhance their fit within the overall education 
system. Inspection roles and frameworks need to be revised to encourage localized 
decision-making and local structures and networks for improvement. Inspections 
need to assess a school’s involvement in partnership working to promote learning, 
and to inspect all schools who are working in a federation, chain or school 
improvement partnership at the same time.28 Frameworks need to evaluate and 
assess the quality and functioning of chains of schools, with the purpose of validating 
and supporting improvement at the local level. Examples of such approaches 
include: 
 The agenda (e.g. standards) for inspection is (also) set by schools and 
stakeholders with the purpose of analyzing, validating and disseminating good 
practices (describing why the good practice worked for the host school, how the 
host school created process knowledge – ‘this is how we did it’ – and making 
explicit the theory underpinning practice – ‘these are the principles underpinning 
why we did it and what we did’). 
 Inspection frameworks include standards on effective cooperation between 
schools/stakeholders, such as local authority school improvement teams. 
 The inspection schedule includes visits to all schools/stakeholders in the cluster 
at the same time. 
 Inspection feedback is given to all schools/stakeholders in an open forum and 
agreements are made to create a shared agenda for change. 
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 inspection frameworks take into account the socio-economic context within which 
schools work, ending the one-size-fits-all approach. 
Examples of such school inspections are currently being implemented and tested in 
small scale settings in the Netherlands and Northern Ireland.  
In the Netherlands, a new vision for more differentiated inspections (‘Toezicht 2020’) 
is being developed which specifically aims to include local stakeholders and local 
information systems in the inspection data collection. The Dutch Inspectorate of 
Education aims to (more) purposefully build on local self and peer evaluation 
structures, both on the school governing board and at school level. These 
developments have been instigated by changes in legislation which require a set of 
schools to work in partnerships to provide inclusive education for all children 
(including children with disabilities) under 76 new (primary) education authorities. 
Each new education authority now governs a set of regular and special needs 
primary schools and has to ensure smooth cooperation between these schools in the 
provision of care and high quality education to each individual pupil. As a result, the 
Inspectorate of Education now needs to inspect the quality and functioning of chains 
of schools. A new inspection framework, (‘toezichtkader voor 
samenwerkingsverbanden’; ‘inspection framework for cooperative chains’), 
describing the quality of partnerships of schools and additional sanctions for 
educational authorities in charge of partnerships of schools, has been developed for 
this purpose.  
In Northern Ireland, schools have been working in networks for some time now and 
the Education and Training Inspectorate (ETI) has developed area-based 
evaluations to support the work of such networks. An example of such a network is 
the West Belfast Partnership Board’s Education and Training forum. They have 
initiated a strategic networked alliance, called the Area Learning Community (ALC), 
consisting of all post primary school principals and all relevant educational 
stakeholders, including the ETI. These principals and their stakeholders have agreed 
on protocols for sharing performance data and school to school support, aligned to 
and agreed upon with the district inspector. The central question underlying these 
protocols, school-to-school support and district inspections are ‘How do we improve 
the quality of education not only in individual schools but for the entire community? 
Both the work of the ALC, as well as area-based inspections and inspection reports 
have this question as their starting point. These specific approaches however still 
need to be evaluated on their merits.  
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